ABSTRACT Many privacy protections in distributed setting are based on secure comparison, according to which two distrusted users try to jointly determine whether a > b, a = b, or a < b. Performing ''secure comparison'' is fundamental to achieve widespread acceptance of privacy protection for distributed setting users. Surprisingly, however, no attention has been paid to secure comparison on fractions, to the best of our knowledge. In this paper, we first present an efficient system for computing ((ka + k 1 )/(kb + k 1 )), which implies the potential relationship (a > b, a = b, and a < b) between a and b, where k, k 1 , and b belong to the party who doesn't have the secret of the system. Based on this system, two distrusted users in distributed setting can learn whether a > b, a = b, or a < b in one execution, without disclosing a and b to each other. Then, we develop two efficient protocols for secure comparison on integers and secure comparison on fractions, respectively. Our schemes, based on homomorphic encryption, are cryptographically secure. We prove that these protocols are secure using simulation paradigm. Our approaches can be used in many secure multi-party computation protocols that involve fractions, rational numbers, and integers. They can also be more convenient to solve some secure multiparty computational geometry problems that often involve ratio evaluation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In applications of network communications and signal processing, we (participants) are often interested in a particular scenario wherein a party P c seeks the cooperation of another party P s to perform a secure comparison task (Secure Two-Party Comparison, STPC). STPC problem can be described as follows. Alice and Bob want to jointly determine the potential relationship (>, = or <) of their confidential numbers without revealing this data to each other nor to anyone else. However, they still want to learn the relationship of their private data. It is the fundamental to secure multiparty computation (SMC), and it plays an important role in many applications, such as price negotiations in electronic auction or bidding systems [1] - [9] , [22] , privacy-preserving computational geometry [10] - [13] , privacy preserving data mining [14] - [19] , and private set intersection [20] , [21] . As a sub-protocol (to be called) of many SMC protocols, the reuse of private information of the involved two parties with no or negligible leakage is all-important. Since many SMC protocols involve a large number of instances of secure comparison, even a minor efficiency gain in secure comparison will bring about significant performance improvements [22] .
Related Works: The secure comparison problem starts from the millionaires' problem that was presented by Yao [23] . It is a cryptographic solution for determining ''greater than'' between two numbers. The complexity of this solution is exponential in the number of bits of the involved numbers. Before long, Cachin [24] put forward a protocol based on the -hiding assumption with constant-round communication complexity, which needs a third party. Thereafter, many efficient comparison protocols without any third party have been constructed [22] , [25] - [29] . Ioannidis and Grama [26] designed a protocol to solve the secure comparison problem based on the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, which takes d-round communication (where d is the length of the private inputs), and is restricted by the security parameter of the oblivious transfer scheme. Fischlin [25] put forward a secure comparison protocol with 2-round communication based on the Goldwasser-Micali encryption scheme. Blake and Kolesnikov [22] and Lin and Tzeng [27] constructed secure comparison protocols with 2-round communication based on the Paillier addition homomorphic cryptosystem and the ElGamal multiplication homomorphic encryption scheme. However, all these protocols with 2-round communication can only solve the greater than secure comparison problem and determine the relation of two integers. Luo et al. [28] proposed a secure comparison protocol by geometric method, which takes 24 log n + 8d + 4 modular multiplications. However, this protocol can only detemine the relation of two real numbers. Veugen et al. [29] gave a comprehensive analysis only on the state-of-the-art integer comparison protocols for a two party setting in the semi-honest security protocol. However, all these analyzed protocols can only compare the numbers less than log n 3 . Li and Wang [30] presented an efficient secure comparison protocol based on homomorphic encryption and the Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic, which can only determine > or ≤ of two integers in one execution. Nakai et al. [31] developed several efficient card-based cryptographic protocols for millionaires' problem utilizing private permutations, which solve the ''greater than'' comparison problem (on integers) in a new perspective. Hezaveh et al. [33] put forward an efficient solution to the socialist millionaires' problem, which can only solve ''equality'' comparison problem (on integers) in an efficient way. Grigoriev et al. [35] solved Yao's millionaires' problem (i.e. greater than comparison on integers) utilizing public-key encryption without computational assumptions. Liu et al. [32] proposed a solution to secure comparison (on integers) based on Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme. Li et al. [34] put forward an efficient solution for the general millionaires' problem based on Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme, which can solve comparison problem (on rational numbers).
All those above protocols have solved the secure comparison problem well. However, no method can be found to solve the millionaires' problem precisely in the fraction field. In this paper, we propose protocols to solve this problem. Our protocols are highly efficient and can precisely figure out the three possible relationships (>, =, <) between two (integer, or rational, or fraction) numbers in one execution.
Contributions: It is quite common in practical applications that the STPC problem is not confined to the integer field. Indeed, private inputs that comprise rational numbers or fractions are more common in general cases. Therefore, a more generalized precise solution to the millionaires' problem is absolutely necessary for the broader field. It is noted that rational numbers comprise integer numbers, and rational numbers can be transformed into fractions but the reverse is not true. Therefore, the solution to the millionaires' problem on fractions is more flexible and adaptable.
We study this problem utilizing the ''ratio'' approach, which can avoid the wrong understanding that the encryption of the difference between two numbers can be evaluated via homomorphic operation of Paillier encryption scheme. Refer to the analysis in paper [38] , the encryption function f (x, y) = (1 + kn) x y n mod n 2 is bijective if and only if (x ∈ Z n ) ∧ (y ∈ Z * n ). That is to say, Paillier encryption scheme can not be used to encrypt negative numbers. In order to solve the secure comparison with a correct utilization of Paillier encryption scheme, we seek to figure out the relationship between two private numbers through evaluating a relationship-ratio. Where, the problem of comparing two fractions can be reduced to computing a relationship-ratio that reflects the relationship between two integers.
Our main contributions are as follows.
(1) We provide a ''ratio'' method for solving general secure comparison problem with a correct utilization of Paillier encryption scheme;
(2) We solve the millionaires' problem precisely for fractions; (3) Our protocols have high efficiency that it can figure out the three potential relationships (<, =, >) between two private numbers from two distrusted parties in one execution; (4) To achieve a lower computational complexity, our protocols entrust the time-consuming exponent calculation ''r n mod n 2 '' to cloud-server in data pretreatment phase. We employ an equivalent but far more efficient way (r n x mod n 2 = R 1 i · R 2 j mod n 2 , where 1 + 2 ) instead of timeconsuming exponent calculation: r n mod n 2 .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the building blocks. Section 3 describes the secure relationship-ratio computing system and shows its correctness and security. Section 4 gives the solution to secure comparison with encrypted integers. Section 5 gives the solution to secure comparison with encrypted fractions. Section 6 compares the performance of different protocols based on the cryptographic computational problem, ''decisional composite residuosity''. Section 7 gives our conclusions.
II. BUILDING BLOCKS
In this section, we describe essential building blocks used in secure comparison (SC) protocols: definitions about twoparty secure computation in Section 2.1, homomorphic encryption (HM) in Section 2.2 and analogous decryption in Section 2.3.
A. DEFINITIONS ABOUT TWO-PARTY SECURE COMPUTATION
Through out this paper, we define security for two party protocols in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. VOLUME 6, 2018 The following definitions are formed according to [36] and [37] . 
where c ≡ represents indistinguishability on computation.
B. HOMOMORPHIC PUBLIC ENCRYPTION (HPKE)
Intuitively, a public key encryption scheme is homomorphic if given two ciphertexts C 1 = E pk (m 1 ; r 1 ) and C 2 = E pk (m 2 ; r 2 ), it is possible to efficiently compute E pk (m 1 p m 2 ; r) by evaluating C 1 c C 2 , where p and c are operations that carried out in plaintext space (M) and cipher space (C), respectively. We abuse notation and use E pk (m) to denote the random variable induced by E pk (m; r), where r is chosen uniformly. We have the following formal definition,
Definition 4 (Homomorphic Public Encryption (HPKE)): A public encryption (G, E, D) is homomorphic if for all N and all (pk, sk) output by key generating algorithm G(1 N ), and for every m
where C 1 , C 2 ∈ C. The Paillier Cryptosystem: Paillier put forward three encryption schemes [38] , where Schemes 1 (see Figure 1 ) is homomorphic. This scheme is semantically secure, assuming hardness of the decisional composite residuosity problem. Note that, the Paillier Scheme 1 has two additively homomorphic properties
which plays an important role in secure computing and computing on encrypted data.
Definition 5 (Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) Problem): Set D be a distinguisher, and let the sets D Ran and D Cr are two distributions:
where τ is the secure parameter and Adv
This is a well-known intractable problem. In other word, for any probabilistic, polynomial-time algorithm D, there is a negligible function δ(τ ) such that
Adv D (τ ) ≤ δ(τ ).
C. PRE-COMPUTATION WITH THE AID OF CLOUD
In order to improve computation efficiency, we assume that both Alice and Bob should develop pre-computation with the aid of cloud prior to their undergoing secure comparison protocols (see in Section 3 and Section 4) as follows.
Alice or Bob selects r i A , r i B ∈ Z * n (r i A , r i B < n) respectively, and both entrust R i = r n i mod n 2 ( ∈ {A, B}) to cloud. After receiving all R i , Alice or Bob permutes R i and stores them in a collection which is denoted by R . When encrypting a message using Paillier scheme, one can employ an equivalent but far more efficient way to evaluate r n mod n 2 as follows. Firstly, one randomly selects several members from R , for example, R i , R j ∈ R as the seeds, then he or she computes r n x mod n 2 = R 1 i · R 2 j mod n 2 , where 1 , 2 and 1 + 2 are small integers. This does not lead to information leakage, which is guaranteed by the semantic security of Paillier encryption scheme.
D. FIGURE OUT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TWO NUMBERS BY EVALUATING RELATIONSHIP-RATIO
Note that the relationship between α, β (where α, β ∈ Z + n ) can be determined by computing
to figure out the relationship between α and β, where
is called relationship-ratio.
III. SECURE RELATIONSHIP-RATIO COMPUTING SYSTEM A. DESCRIPTION OF SECURE RELATIONSHIP-RATIO COMPUTING SYSTEM
Without loss of generality, assuming the communicating parties, Alice and Bob have secrets related to a and b, respectively. Alice and Bob try to jointly evaluate the relationship of their private data by performing a secure relationship-ratio computing system, but they do not want to disclose their secrets to each other.
In what follows, we give the description of secure relationship-ratio computing system, which is composed of three random algorithms: Key-Generation, Encrypted Relationship-Ratio Development and Relationship-Ratio Computation. The system is denoted as (Key − Gen, Enc − RRD, RR − Computation): Key-Gen: Alice runs the key generation algorithm to generate her public-key (n, 1 + n) and private key λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1).
Enc-RRD:
(1) Alice randomly selects r a ∈ Z * n and encrypts her secret a into C (a,1+n) as follows.
Then Alice sends it to Bob. (2) After receiving C (a,1+n) , Bob works as follows.
-Selects a random number r b ∈ Z * n and encrypts his private information b into C (b,1+n) as follows.
, r b2 , r b3 ∈ Z * n and evaluates:
Then Bob sends the pair (
Note that the process used to evaluate
is analogous to the decryption of Paillier, while the output of this process is a real number 0 < R = Ka+K 2 Kb+K 2 < n 2 rather VOLUME 6, 2018 than an integer on Z n . We call it Relationship-Ratio Computation in following sections.
Relationship out of relationship-ratio computing. Obviously, one can figure out the relationship of a and b through determining the relationship of 
Because of this, we define this process as relationship out of relationship-ratio computing. Proof: Recall that the DCR challenger works as follows: it generates (p, q, n), and chooses a random number r ∈ Z n and f uniformly from {0, 1}, sets R = r n mod n 2 if f = 0 and R = R if f = 1, and finally gives (n, (n, R)) to the attacker.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Let (Key − Generation, Homomorphicencryption, Analogousdecryption) be our developed system. Let A be a polynomial-time algorithm attacking (A could be external or internal). We may construct an algorithm B to solve the DCR problem as follows. Algorithm B runs in polynomial time because A runs in polynomial time. Consequently, the operations in G(1 k ) can be performed in polynomial time. By Bayes theorem, we can evaluate the probability that B wins the DCR security game as follows.
Algorithm
When f = 0, the DCR challenger sets R = r n mod n 2 , and thus the view that B presents to A is identical to that of the actual IND-CPA secure game against . Therefore, the probability that d = d given f = 0 is the same as the probability that A wins the IND-CPA secure game against , i.e.,
When f = 1, the DRC challenger sets R = R. Since R is uniformly selected from Z n 2 . It follows that (1 + n) m d · R (mod n 2 ) is uniformly distributed on the group Z /n 2 Z . Moreover, the random variables m 0 , m 1 
From (4), (5) and (6), it follows that
Thus, B wins the DCR security game with advantage:
By Definition 5, algorithm B might win the DCR security game with only a negligible advantage, so δ 2 must be negligible, which implies that δ is also negligible. Therefore, algorithm A has only a negligible advantage δ in the IND-CPA game against .
Theorem 2: If the system has indistinguishable encryptions under adaptive chosen plaintext attacks, then Alice and Bob can securely figure out the relationship between a and b through system .
Proof: For Alice, knowing λ and K 1 , she can figure out the relationship between a and b using relation out of fuzzy computing, but cannot obtain any additional information about K , b, K 2 and K 1 .
For Bob, due to the sematic security of the system , C (a,1+n) = (1 + n) a r n a mod n 2 is computationally indistinguishable from r n mod n 2 (r is a randomness from Z * n ). Hence, Alice and Bob can securely figure out the relationship between a and b through system .
IV. SECURE COMPARISON WITH ENCRYPTED INTEGER INPUTS
In this section, utilizing the secure relationship-ratio computing system, we first propose a new protocol (denoted as SCEII) for securely comparing two integers. Then, we analyze its security, correctness and efficiency in the standard model (simulation-based security).
A. DESCRIPTION OF PROTOCOL SCEII
Based on pre-computation, homomorphic operation and with the aid of cloud, we design an efficient protocol for securely comparing integers in semi-honest setting. To securely compare their integer numbers (Alice with X and Bob with Y ), Alice and Bob proceed the protocol SCEII as follows.
Step 1. Alice runs the key generation algorithm to generate her keys, and then she publishes the publickey (n, 1 + n) but keeps λ as her private key.
Step 2. Alice firstly selects a random number R 1 A ∈ R A , and then encrypts her private X by her own public-key as follows.
Then Alice sends c X to Bob. Parallel operation. Before receiving c X , Bob works as follows.
• Selects r Y ∈ Z + n−1 , r XY ∈ Z + n , R 1 B , R 2 B ∈ R B randomly and evaluates
(10b)
• Selects γ 1 , γ 2 , . . . , γ 2 1 −2 ∈ Z + n ( 1 ≥ 2) such that half of the numbers
, . . . ,
are greater than 1 but the remaining half are less than 1.
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ 1 − 1, randomly chooses k i ∈ Z n and R (2i+1) B , R (2i+2) B ∈ R B , and evaluates ciphertext pairs as follows.
(11b)
Step 3. After receiving c X , Bob works as follows.
x Selects a random number R Y ∈ R, and computes c X +r XY using the homomorphism of Paillier cryptosystem as follows.
. (12) y Implements an permutation on these above c γ 3 , c γ 4 ) , . . . , (c γ 2 −3 , c γ 2 −2 )), and denotes this permutation as (c 1 , c 2 ), (c 3 , c 4 ) , . . . , (c 2 1 −1 , c 2 1 ), then sends them to Alice.
Step 4. After receiving (c 1 , c 2 ), (c 3 , c 4 ) , . . . , (c 2 1 −1 , c 2 1 ), Alice evaluates
), where
and sends Sign to Bob.
Step 5. After receiving Sign, by
is even or 1 = 1)
Or
Bob could figure out the relationship of X and Y .
B. ANALYSIS OF CORRECTNESS
Theorem 3: Given the function
and 1 ciphertext pairs which is developed by Bob as Protocol 3.1, Alice can educe the relationship of X and Y (X > Y ,X < Y or X = Y ) through analogous decryption and the following equation
).
Proof: First, we list two mathematical facts support this theorem as follows. 
is shared between Alice and Bob, if Bob interfuses a fraction F N with ω random fractions (χ 1 , χ 2 , . . . , χ ω ) selected randomly beforehand such that half of them are greater than 1, and then sends these ω + 1 fraction to Alice; Alice can figure out that F N > 1, F N < 1 or F N = 1, but cannot figure out which one is F N . This is because that half of χ 1 , χ 2 , . . . , χ ω are greater than 1 but the remaining half are less than 1, so we have
If we add one more fraction to these ω fractions, then we obtain
Based on Fact 1, through equations (5b), (7) and (8) in Section 3 and analogous decryption, we obtain
Based on Fact 1 and Fact 2, through equation (8) and analogous decryption, Alice can determine the relationship of X and Y . After receiving Sign, Bob can also know the relationship of X and Y by function P( ). However, he can not evaluate any other information about Alice by function P( ). So the protocol SCEII is correct.
C. ANALYSIS OF SECURITY

Theorem 4: Protocol SCEII can be used to compare X and Y securely.
Proof: Protocol SCEII is developed to make Alice and Bob figure out the relationship of X and Y (X > Y , X = Y or X < Y ) while keeping the privacy of X and Y . The only insecure factor in this comparison protocol is whether it has additional information leakage of the inputs or not. Next, we prove that there is no additional information leakage in the process of comparison.
For Alice's privacy, we construct a simulator S B which simulates the protocol by selecting a random X as the input of Alice, and letting Y as the input of Bob. The view generated by S B is (Y , c X ) and the view in the real execution is (Y , c X ) . c X and c X are indistinguishable, which is guaranteed by the fact that Alice's private data transferred to Bob is encrypted by her own public-key (n, 1+n) and the sematic security of the system . Thus S B (c X , Y ) and the real view View B (c X , Y ) are indistinguishable.
For Bob's privacy, we construct a simulator S A to simulate the view of Alice without the private input of Bob. We need the view generated by S A being indistinguishable from the view of Alice in the real execution. S A simulates as follows.
The Becuase c X +r XY is the encryption of the addition of X and r XY , which is evaluated using homomorphic operation on the ciphertext c X , and c X +r XY is one of c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c 2 1 , so the distribution is identical to that of the real execution.
D. ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENCY
Theorem 5 (Efficiency): Protocol SCEII is three-round and takes at most 2 1 log n + 2d + 4 1 modular multiplications.
Proof: Alice sends messages to Bob in Step 2 and Step 4, and Bob sends messages to Alice in Step 3. Thus, protocol SCEII is three-round. We neglect the cost of generating the public key in Step 1 since this can be done in the setup stage. The cost of pre-evaluation with the aid of cloud(s) prior to protocol SCEII are also neglected. In Step 2, Alice conducts one encryption:
which takes 2 modular multiplications; At the same time, Bob conducts 2 1 − 2 encryptions, which takes 4 1 − 4 modular multiplications. In Step 4, Bob needs to conduct one modular exponentiations. In Step 4, Alice does 1 analogous decryptions, which takes 2 1 log n modular multiplications. To compare fairly, we convert all operations to the number of modular multiplications [27] . So to privately and cooperatively figure out the relationship of X and Y by protocol SCEII, in total, 2 log n + 4 1 + 4 modular multiplications and one modular exponentiations should be taken. Computing c X +r XY = (c X ) r Y · c r XY · R Y (mod n 2 ) takes at most 2d + 2 modular multiplications [28] . Overall, protocol SCEII needs 2 1 log n + d + 4 1 modular multiplications (see as Table 1 ). 
V. SECURE COMPARISON ON FRACTIONS
In this section, based on the secure relationship-ratio computing system, we first present a new cloud-assisted protocol(denoted as SCOF) for securely comparing fractions. Then, we conduct analysises on its security, correctness and efficiency. To securely and efficiently compare their fractions (Alice with 
A. DESCRIPTION OF PROTOCOL SCOF
Step . Alice runs the key generation algorithm to generate her keys, then publishes the public-key (n, 1+ n) but keeps λ as her private key.
Step . Alice first expresses her private fraction a b as (a, b), then randomly chooses R Aa , R Ab ∈ R A and encrypts a, b as follows.
And sends (C a ,C b ) to Bob. Before receiving (C a , C b ) , Bob needs to do as follows
• Randomly chooses r ∈ Z + n , R B 1 ∈ R B and computes
. (17) • Chooses ϒ 1 , ϒ 2 , . . . , ϒ 2 −2 ∈ Z + n ( 2 ≥ 1) such that half of the numbers
• Randomly chooses k j ∈ Z n (where1 ≤ j ≤ 2 − 1) and R B 2j+1 , R B 2j+2 ∈ R B , and evaluates 2 − 1 ciphertext pairs as follows.
Step . After receiving (C a , C b ), Bob works as follows.
x First expresses his private fraction 
y Randomly chooses R 1 , R 2 ∈ R B and computes C ad+r , C bc+r as follows.
z Implements a permutation on these ciphertext pairs (
, and denotes this permutation as (C 1 , C 2 ), (C 3 , C 4 ), . . . , (C 2 2 −1 , C 2 2 ), and sends them to Alice.
Step . After receiving (C j , C j+1 ), Alice evaluates Sign as follows.
And sends it to Bob. Step . After receiving Sign, Bob can figure out the relationship of a b (belonged to Alice) and c d (belonged to Bob) by where   2   2 is even or 2 = 1)
2 is odd).
B. ANALYSIS OF CORRECTNESS
Fact 3: Given
could be used to determine the relationship of . Based on Fact 3, through equations (14a), (14b), (15a) and (15b) in Section 5.1 and analogous decryption
), we can draw a conclusion that
Based on Fact 1 and Fact 3, through equation (16) Assuming is the protocol SCOF that we developed to compute function View A ((a, b), (c, d) ) and her output is denoted as Output A ((a, b), (c, d) ). Similarly, the view and output of Bob are denoted by View B ((a, b), (c, d) ) and Output B ((a, b), (c, d) ), respectively. For Alice's privacy, we construct a simulator S B which simulates the protocol by selecting a randomness C c , C d ), (C a , C b ) ). (C a , C b ) and (C a , C b ) are indistinguishable, which is guaranteed by the fact that Alice's private data transferred to Bob is encrypted by his own public-key (n, 1 + n) and the sematic security of the system . Therefore,
, d). The view of Alice is denoted as
Namely, the simulator S B constructed as above makes
The input of S A are the comparing result Sign ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and Alice's private input ((a, b), (C 1 , C 2 ), (C 3 , C 4 ) , . . . , (C 2 2 −1 , C 2 2 ), Sign).
Becuase C ad +r and C bc +r are evaluated by homomorphic operation, where Alice only know a, b and some dubious information that the ciphertext pair (C ad +r , C bc +r ) is one of (C 1 , C 2 ), (C 3 , C 4 ), . . . , (C 2 2 −1 , C 2 2 ), so the distribution is identical to that in the real execution. Namely, the simulator S A constructed as above makes
D. ANALYSIS OF EFFICIENCY
Theorem 7 (Efficiency): Protocol SCOF is three-round and takes at most 2 2 log n + 4d + 2 modular multiplications.
Proof: Alice transfers messages to Bob in Step and Step , and Bob transfers message to Alice in Step . Thus, protocol SCOF is three-round. We neglect the cost of generating a public key in Step since this can be done in the setup stage. The cost of pre-evaluation with the aid of cloud(s) prior to protocol SCOF are also neglected. In Step , Alice conducts two encryptions
At the same time, Bob needs to develop 2 1 − 2 encryptions. In Step , Bob conducts two modular exponentiations. In Step , Alice conducts 2 analogous decryptions. To compare fairly, we convert all operations to the number of modular multiplications [27] . Hence, to compare a b and c d by protocol SCOF, in total, 2 2 encryption and 2 analogous decryptions and two modular exponentiations should be taken. For our homomorphic-encryption-analogous-decryption system, each encryption requires 2 modular multiplications, and each decryption also requires 2 log n modular multiplications. Computing C ad+r = C a · C r · R 1 (mod n) 2 or C bc+r = C b ·C r ·R 2 (mod n) 2 takes at most 2d +2 modular multiplications [28] . Overall, protocol SCOF needs 2 2 log n + 4d + 4 2 + 2 modular multiplications (see as Table 2 ).
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSES
Except protocols [28] , [32] , [34] , the existing solutions to the millionaires' problem are all for integers, thus they cannot be compared with our protocols in an objective manner. However, for a wrong utilization that using Paillier encryption scheme to directly encrypt an negative number, protocols [28] , [29] , [32] , [34] have failed to solve what as they claimed.
We compare the protocols [27] - [30] , [32] , [34] based on the same cryptographic computational problem, DCR, as our protocols. To compare fairly, we convert all operations of these protocols (based on DCR) to the number of modular multiplications, respectively. In comparison with previous methods [27] , [30] , although protocol SCEII is 3-round, it reduces the number of modular computation significantly. Moreover, protocol SCEII can determine whether x > y, x < y or x = y (where x, y are integers less than n − 1)in one execution, and protocol SCOF can figure out whether x > y, x < y or x = y (whre x, y are fractions less than n − 1) in one execution, while previous Li's method [30] can only solve the greater than problem. In comparison with Li [30] , our method cannot only be used to securely compare two integers but also two fractions. On the efficiency, in comparison with previous methods [27] , [30] , SCEII and SCOF have considerable advantages on total computing cost when 1 , 2 ∈ {0, 2}. The detailed comparisons with previous methods are listed as Table 3 .
VII. CONCLUSION
Comparing information privately is the fundamental to secure multiparty computation and plays an important role in developing practical SMC protocols. Although there are several protocols claimed that the millionaires' problem for rational numbers had been solved, these solutions are supported by a wrong understanding that Paillier encryption scheme could encrypt a negative number (However, the encryption function f (x, y) = (1 + kn) x y n mod n 2 is bijective if and only if (x ∈ Z n ) ∧ (y ∈ Z * n ) by reference to the detailed analysis in paper [38] , namely, Paillier encryption scheme can not be directly used to encrypt negative numbers). In fact, the existing solutions are all designed for integers and they fail to meet the needs of many practical applications. In this study, we extend the millionaires' problem for fractions, where we skilfully combine ''ratio'' method and propose efficient protocols to obtain solutions. We have shown the security of these protocols. In future research, we aim to extend the solution to the millionaires' problem further to solve more practical SMC problems that involve ratio computation.
